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We study whether cultural attitudes towards gender, the young, and leisure are significant determinants
of the evolution over time of the employment rates of women and of the young, and of hours worked
in OECD countries. Beyond controlling for a larger menu of policies, institutions and structural characteristics
of the economy than has been done so far, our analysis improves upon existing studies of the role of
"culture" for labor market outcomes by dealing explicitly with the endogeneity of attitudes, policies
and institutions, and by allowing for the persistent nature of labor market outcomes. When we do all
this we find that culture still matters for women employment rates and for hours worked. However,
policies and other institutional or structural characteristics are also important. Attitudes towards youth
independence, however, do not appear to be important in explaining the employment rate of the young.
In the case of women employment rates, the policy variable that is significant along with attitudes,
is the OECD index of employment protection legislation. For hours worked the policy variables that
play a role, along with attitudes, are the tax wedge and unemployment benefits. The quantitative impact
of these policy variables is such that changes in policies have at least the potential to undo the effect
of variations in cultural traits on labor market outcomes.
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A number of labor market outcomes￿ the employment rate of women and of the young, the yearly
hours worked by those who have a job￿ di⁄er substantially across the OECD. In the period 1999-
2002, for instance, the employment rate of those in the age bracket 16 to 25 was on average 41
per cent in Mediterranean countries, 43 percent in Continental Europe, and 58 per cent in Anglo-
Saxon countries. In the same years the employment rate of women was 59 percent in Mediterranean
countries and 80 percent in Nordic countries. These variables have also evolved di⁄erently within
each group of countries over time: for instance, between the early 1980￿ s and the beginning of this
decade the employment rate of women has remained virtually constant in the Nordic countries,
while it has increased by almost 20 percentage points in Continental Europe and in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, and by 6 points in Japan. Average hours of work tend to decrease in the 80￿ s,
although at a di⁄erent pace in each group of countries. In the 90￿ s the rate of decrease tends to be
smaller in Continental countries, and near to zero in Mediterranean and Nordic countries.
It has been claimed that attitudes towards gender and the young, what is sometimes referred to
as a country￿ s "culture", are important determinants of the cross-country and time series di⁄erences
in the employment rates of various demographic groups.(see for instance Algan and Cahuc (2007)
and Fortin (2005)). In related work, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) have asked whether
culture could explain the observed di⁄erence in hours worked between Europe and the United
States, and Fortin (2008) has studied the e⁄ect of culture on an individual￿ s decision to join the
labor market in the United States.
However, the evidence on the role of "culture" on a country￿ s labor market outcomes has so
far been inconclusive, mainly for three reasons. First, as noted by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote
(2005), these papers often fail to allow for other factors that may determine labor market outcomes,
in particular the di⁄erences across countries and the evolution within a country of economic struc-
ture (for instance the share of the services sector) and of labor market policies and institutions.
Second, these analyses rarely recognize that the variables used to capture a country￿ s "culture" are
typically endogenous: attitudes towards leisure and work, for instance, are likely to be a⁄ected by
a person￿ s own labor market experience and by the experience of those around her. Finally, these
papers seldom allow for the fact that employment rates and hours of work evolve gradually over
time.
Our aim is to investigate whether culture plays a statistically and economically signi￿cant role
when one tries to take care of the endogeneity of workers￿attitudes, to allow for the persistent nature
of labor market outcomes, and to control for a large menu of policies and institutions, recognizing￿
as is the case of attitudes￿ that some of these variables are also likely to be endogenous.
The investigation of the e⁄ects of workers￿attitudes on labor market outcomes is part of a more
general research program aimed at assessing the e⁄ect of culture on economic phenomena. The
endogeneity of cultural traits is one of the central issues in this literature and various authors have
tackled it di⁄erent ways. Alesina and Giuliano (2007) use a variable based on the grammatical rule
of pronoun drop as an instrument for a particular cultural trait: family ties. Guiso, Sapienza and
2Zingales (2006) use the percentage of adherents to various religious denominations as an instrument
for thrift, a cultural trait supposed to a⁄ect aggregate saving. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz
(2007) and Tabellini (2008b) investigate the role of culture in determining the quality of institutions,
and also use a linguistic variable as an instrument for culture.1 These papers are mostly cross
sectional in nature. Even if repeated observations over time are available, country-￿xed e⁄ects are
typically not introduced because the instruments have little or no time variation. The exception is
Tabellini (2008a) who instruments cultural traits￿ such as trust, obedience and respect￿ with past
literacy rates and past institutions, and runs a cross sectional regression with regional data. This
allows him to introduce country-speci￿c e⁄ects, but obviously no region e⁄ects.
In their excellent survey of this literature Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) de￿ne culture
as "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit fairly
unchanged from generation to generation". This de￿nition highlights the di¢ culties at identifying
a country-speci￿c e⁄ect of "culture". If culture is a time-invariant characteristic of a country it
is very di¢ cult to recover its causal in￿ uence on economic outcomes separately from the e⁄ect of
other country-speci￿c constant characteristics.2 This paper exploits the variation within countries
as well as across countries of cultural attitudes, policies and institutions. The use of panel data
information allows us, potentially, to assess the e⁄ect of the time varying component of culture,
policies and institutions in determining a country￿ s labor market outcomes, controlling for all time
invariant country characteristics. We are unable, of course, to determine the extent to which cross-
country di⁄erences in labor market outcomes￿ in hours worked for instance￿ re￿ ect time-invariant
cultural traits, or time-invariant policies and institutions, because they will all be absorbed by the
country ￿xed e⁄ects.
This approach is obviously informative only to the extent that attitudes, in addition to policies
and institutions, have a signi￿cant time-varying component that di⁄ers across countries. This is
the case, for instance, with the set of attitudes towards the role of women in the family and in the
workplace￿ a potentially important cultural determinant of women employment outcomes: over
the last quarter century, these particular attitudes have changed substantially and in a way that
varies from one country to another. The same is true for attitudes towards desirable characteristics
of the young, such as independence, and towards the value of leisure.
As in previous studies, we use the World Value Survey (WVS) to obtain a measure of attitudes
towards women￿ s work and towards youth independence, and assess their e⁄ect on the employment
rate of women and the young, respectively. We also analyze the importance of attitudes towards
holidays for average hours worked, a topic not investigated so far in the literature. Time varying
measures for such attitudes are available at (approximately) equally spaced intervals of ten years
for a set of OECD countries, from the beginning of the eighties to the beginning of the twenty ￿rst
1Brugger, Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) use a regression discontinuity design across language barriers in Switzerland
to investigate the e⁄ect of culture on unemployment.
2In a cross sectional context, the basic problem resides in the questionable assumption of orthogonality between
the culture variable (or the instruments used for it) and the error term in the equation of interest, since one cannot
control for time invariant unobservables.
3century.3
As we already mentioned, a country￿ s attitudes cannot be assumed to be exogenous. Attitudes
towards women, or the young, or towards leisure are likely to be a⁄ected by present and past
individual and aggregate labor market outcomes (in addition to policies and institutions). We
thus need to use (time varying) instruments which are correlated with such attitudes but are
uncorrelated with contemporaneous innovations in labor market outcomes￿ although they may
re￿ ect past innovations. In the dynamic panel estimation framework proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1992) and Blundell and Bond (1998) these instruments can then be treated as predetermined
variables. The GMM framework also allows us to account for the fact that labor market outcomes
tend to have a degree of persistence over time, thus requiring the estimation of dynamic models for
employment or hours.
One of the instruments we use is the percentage of people who believe in God, interacted
with a country￿ s historically prevalent religious a¢ liation (Catholic, Protestant, etc.). Another
instrument re￿ ects the degree of trust in others. Our identifying assumption is that the evolution
over time of these instruments is correlated with the evolution over time of those attitudes that
are more directly relevant for the labor market: attitudes toward gender roles, youth independence
and importance of holidays. But, contrary to those attitudes, the variables we use as instruments
(i) are not (contemporaneously) a⁄ected by labor market outcomes and (ii) a⁄ect outcomes only
through such attitudes, once we control for other time varying policies, institutions and structural
variables.4
We then extend our set of instruments to include the attitudes towards women and towards sex
and trust of second or higher generation American immigrants from di⁄erent countries at di⁄erent
point in times. The evolution over time of the attitudes of American immigrants is correlated with
that of attitudes in the country of origin, but can be assumed to be exogenous because they respond
to institutional and economic shocks in the U.S. but are unlikely to be correlated, under certain
assumptions, with economic shocks in the country of origin5.
Our results thus improve upon previous ￿ndings, in particular on the seminal contributions of
Algan and Cahuc (2007) and Fortin (2005) in three respects. Because those papers: (i) do not
address the problem of endogeneity, (ii) rely on a static speci￿cation of labor market outcomes,
and (iii) control for a much more limited menu of policies, institutions and structural variables.
We ￿nd that, even after instrumenting, controlling for the role of time-varying structure, policies
3They are also available for the mid 1990￿ s, but we have decided to rely on the lower frequency variation in order
to give more time to attitude to evolve and because the survey in the mid 1990￿ s is available only for a subset of
countries.
4Fortin (2008) uses individual attitudes towards sex and politics as an instrument for family attitudes in an
equation that explains a woman￿ s participation decision in the U.S..
5The correlation between the behavior of immigrants and that of residents in the country of origin has been noted
and exploited by several authors. For instance, Giuliano (2007) documents and studies the similarity in the living
arrangements of children of immigrants with those in the country of origin. Fernandez (2007) shows that women
participation rates are related to the aggregate participation rate in the country of origin. Algan and Cahuc (2008)
use the attitudes of American immigrants towards trust as an instrument to study the e⁄ect of trust on the growth
rate of a country￿ s per capita income in the long run (between 1935 and 2000).
4and institutions and for the persistence of participation and hours worked, culture still matters
for two out of the three outcomes under study. Attitudes towards women￿ s role in the family
and attitudes towards leisure are statistically and economically important determinants of the
employment rate of women and of average hours worked, respectively. However, policies and other
institutional or structural characteristics of the labor market also matter, even when we recognize
that policies and institutions may be endogenous because they may re￿ ect changing economic
conditions and cultural values. Attitudes towards youth independence, however, do not appear to
be important in explaining the employment rate of the young. In the case of women employment
rates, the policy variable that is signi￿cant along with attitudes, is the OECD index of employment
protection legislation. For hours worked the policy variables that play a role, along with attitudes,
is the tax wedge and bene￿ts. The quantitative impact of these policy variables is such that changes
in policies have at least the potential to undo the e⁄ect of variations in cultural traits on labor
market outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how the WVS data can be used to
measure attitudes in OECD countries. In Section 3 we describe the econometric problem one faces
when trying to assess a causal e⁄ect of attitudes on labor market outcomes. We then describe two
IV estimation strategies based, respectively, on the evolution of deeper attitudes and on the changes
in attitudes of immigrants to the United States from various countries. In Section 4 we report the
Within Estimates (which do not address the issue of endogeneity, nor the persistence of outcomes)
to provide a baseline and a comparison with previous results. Section 5 and 6 contain a discussion
of the choice of instruments and of the GMM estimates of dynamic models for employment and
hours. Section 7 concludes.
2 What do we mean by culture and how do we measure it?
The World value Survey (WVS)￿ the main source of our data￿ includes a number of questions
whose answers can be used to measure beliefs and values that are likely to be relevant for the
aggregate employment rate of women and of the young, and for average hours of work. Such beliefs
evolve over time, although they are likely to contain a country speci￿c time invariant component.
The answers to a ￿rst set of questions capture a set of attitudes that, arguably, are of a direct
relevance for labor market outcomes and will be used as explanatory variables in the employment
or hours equation. One example is ￿Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be
ful￿lled or is this not necessary?￿: this is the question whose answers we use to measure attitudes
that could a⁄ect women employment rates. We also use the answers to the question "Do you agree
or disagree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a
job than women", but more sparingly, since it is available for a shorter period of time. When using
these answers one must be aware that high employment rates for women are likely to be both a
cause and an e⁄ect of attitudes towards what is necessary for a woman￿ s ful￿llment. Moreover, the
answer to such a question could be a⁄ected by policy￿ for instance by rasing the level of education
5of women￿ or by economic structure, for instance by changes in the share of the service sector
in total employment￿ which presumably raises the number of jobs available for women. Another
example is the question we use to measure attitudes that could a⁄ect hours worked: ￿Here are
some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which
ones you personally think are important in a job. Generous holidays￿ , where the answer might be
a⁄ected by a worker￿ s probability of ￿nding (and/or maintaining) a job￿ if he asks for too frequent
holidays￿ and thus by the cyclical state of the labor market, or by the strength of unions.6 The
same is true for question we use to measure attitudes that could a⁄ect the employment rate of the
young: ￿Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any
do you consider to be especially important? Independence￿ . The answer to this questions might be
a⁄ected by ￿ uctuations in the youth employment rate. We use the three questions we have just
reported to identify the (time varying) role of attitudes on the three labor market outcomes we are
interested in: the employment rate of women, that of the young, and the yearly hours worked by
those who have a job.
Since we are concerned by the possible correlation of our measures of attitudes with current
labor market conditions, as well as with policies and institutions, we need to ￿nd instruments to
identify their e⁄ects on employment and hours. As mentioned in the Introduction, we use two sets
of instruments. First, the answers to a set of questions in the WVS that re￿ ect deeper attitudes,
i.e. features of a society￿ s beliefs and values that change over time, but do so only slowly￿
and are thus unlikely to be a⁄ected by current labor market conditions￿ yet are likely to contain
information about the evolution over time of attitudes towards gender, youth and leisure. After
some experimentation, the main variable we use are answers to the question: "Which, if any, of the
following do you believe in? God￿ . This religious attitude variable is interacted with a country￿ s
prevalent historical religious a¢ liation (Catholic, Protestant, and other (Japan)) We have also
experimented with answers to the question "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about
how often do you attend religious services these days?". We will point out below the similarities
and di⁄erences with the results obtained using the belief in God as an instrument.
We also use the answers to the question: ￿Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you can￿ t be too careful in dealing with people?￿(one possible answer being
"Most people can be trusted￿ , the others "Can￿ t be too careful￿and ￿Don￿ t know￿). The basic idea,
as we shall discuss in Section 5, is that these deeper attitudes are likely to be correlated with
attitudes towards women, the young and leisure that we use as explanatory variables, but they are
not likely to a⁄ect labor market outcomes directly. Moreover, while outcomes and current policies
can a⁄ect these deeper attitudes, they are assumed to do so only with a lag.
Second, we use as instruments the attitudes of second or higher generation immigrants to the
United States, classi￿ed by country of origin, obtained from the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS).
The idea here is that the evolution over time of the attitudes of each immigrant group is informative
6See Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008) for a theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationships between
labour market institutions and policies and beliefs about cooperation in the labor market.
6about changes of attitudes in the country of origin, yet they are much less likely to be a⁄ected by
shocks to labor market outcomes there. To capture the attitudes of US second (or third) generation
immigrants towards women work we use answers to the question "Do you approve or disapprove of
a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting
her?" We also explore as an instruments their attitude towards trust, measured in the same way
as for the country of residence, and towards premarital sex. In this latter case we have used the
answers to the question ￿There￿ s been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about
sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, only sometimes, or not wrong at all?￿. We will
discuss in greater length our choice of instruments in Section 3 and 5 below and report the GMM
estimates in Section 6.
Let us return now to the choice of explanatory variables. Since our dependent variables are
aggregate labor market outcomes, the explanatory variable we are interested in are a country￿ s
average attitudes. For instance, when we study women￿ s participation we are interested in gender
attitudes of both women and men: the ￿rst since it a woman￿ s decision whether or not to look for
a job; the second, because hiring decisions could be made by men. Average attitudes however have
a problem: they could move over time because the composition of the population (and thus of the
sample in WVS) changes over time, not because the role of speci￿c national features changes. For
instance, the share of highly educated people in the sample could change. We could correct for this
introducing such composition variables directly in the regression for aggregate outcomes, but this
would consume too many degrees of freedom.
The alternative, following Algan and Cahuc (2007), and this is the strategy we have chosen,
is to estimate a probit model for each question for each wave controlling for the main individual
characteristics and including country-e⁄ects which capture the role of speci￿c national features (see
Table 1 for probit estimates for the wave 1999-2004).7 We control for age and age squared, for
the level of education, the marital status, the number of children, the family income (coded by the
surveys between low, middle and high income) and for the employment status. The inclusion of
the employment status should minimize the risk that answers to the attitudinal questions may be
a pure re￿ ection of one￿ s employment experience. We also include the respondent￿ s political views
(coded by the surveys between left, center and right) and their religious views by distinguishing the
following main categories: Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Muslim, Jews, other religions and with
no religion a¢ liation. The variables we use to measure cultural attitudes are thus the estimated
wave speci￿c country e⁄ects in the probit regressions for gender attitudes, for attitudes towards
youth independence, and towards the importance of holidays.8(We will follow a similar procedure
7A closely related alternative is to interact the country dummies with wave dummies, but to impose the restriction
that the coe¢ cients of the individual characteristics variables are constant through time.
8Actually Algan and Cahuc (2006a) use as regressor in the outcome equations the marginal e⁄ects of the coun-
try/wave variables. We do not follow this strategy because the average value of the individual variables a⁄ects the
point at which the cumulative density function is evaluated to obtain the marginal e⁄ects. This may reintroduce
composition e⁄ects that one intended to eliminate estimating a probit for each wave and recovering the wave speci￿c
country e⁄ects.
7to identify a country￿ s average attitudes when we use instruments based on deeper attitudes of
country of residence and US immigrants￿attitudes.9). Using the within country variation of the
country/wave e⁄ects one can hope to identify the e⁄ects on labor market outcomes of the time
varying components of attitudes, controlling for those of components that remain unchanged over
time and which cannot be separated form other country-speci￿c and time-invariant components of
institutions and policies that are captured by the country ￿xed e⁄ects.
We use data for those OECD countries in the WVS for which data are available at (approx-
imately) equally spaced intervals of ten years (around 1980, 1990 and 2000) and we estimate the
probit for the sample of working age population between 16 and 64 years of age 10. Figure 1
documents how the answers to each of the questions we use change across the three waves.
The ￿rst panel of Figure 1 shows how the country wave e⁄ects of attitudes toward women (the
answer to the question ￿Do you think that a woman has to have children....", coded so that higher
values correspond to more liberal attitudes towards women working) change across the three waves
in each country￿ we collect countries in three clusters plus one for Denmark, and one for Japan11.
This is important because our identi￿cation comes from the time variation of these variables. The
pattern for all groups shows a shift toward "conservatism" (meaning that the country-wave e⁄ects
of the answers shift towards a view that women need to have children to be ful￿lled) from 1980 to
1990, followed by a shift in the opposite direction in the following decade. Such shifts are consistent,
possibly, with a political shift from progressive to conservative (Reagan in the US, Thatcher in the
UK, ...) that occurred in many countries at the beginning of the 1980s, followed by a shift toward
more progressive politics (Clinton, Blair...) in the following decade. Note that, within this common
pattern, the shifts occur at di⁄erent rates and are re￿ ected in the slopes of the lines being di⁄erent
for each cluster. Denmark appears not to rebound from a shift toward more conservatism.
The other panels of Figure 1 repeat the exercise for the country-wave e⁄ects of the other two
attitudes (higher values re￿ ect greater value placed on youth independence or on the importance
of holidays). In each case the data show that all measures of culture we use are time varying.
The value placed on youth independence appears to increase during the 1980￿ s and decrease in the
1990￿ s, although at di⁄erent rates in each country. The evolution of attitudes towards holidays does
not display any common pattern, although the importance of generous holidays increases for all
countries between 1980 and 1990 and decreases or remains stationary for most countries from 1990
to 2000.
Finally in Figure 2 we report the evolution of the employment rate for women and for youth, and
average annual hours12. Employment rates for women increase in every region, over our sample,
9We group immigrants from some countries in the same clusters of origin in order to have enough observations in
each group when we run the probit regressions (see the Data Appendix for more details).
10For most countries the attitude variables we use are available for all three waves. For some countries, for only
two waves. Details, including the precise timing of the surveys, are contained in the Data Appendix.
11The countries belonging to each cluster are: Anglo-Saxon (Canada, Ireland,UK and US), European continental
(Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands), Mediterranean (Italy, Spainl). The countries for which we do not have 3
observations are shown separately but they are given the same colour of the cluster they are commonly associated
with.
12For most countries, all these variables represent four year averages over the period 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-
8with the only exception of the Nordic countries (where women participation has been historically
very high) and Japan, where they have been stable in the 90￿ s. The pattern of employment rates
for the youth varies more across countries: it falls by 15 percentage points in the Mediterranean
countries, more quickly in the 80￿ s; it falls in the Nordic countries in the 80￿ s and then it remains
stable in the 90￿ s; it falls and then recovers in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Average hours of work
tend to decrease in the 80￿ s, although at a di⁄erent pace in each country. In the 90￿ s the rate of
decrease tends to be smaller in many countries, but not in all of them.
The bottom line is that our measures of attitudes are not constant over time and vary over
time at di⁄erent rates. Their e⁄ect can thus be potentially identi￿ed separately from that of other
cultural traits that instead are constant over time and therefore can not be identi￿ed separately from
other non time-varying country characteristic. Whether there is a signi￿cant correlation between
labor market outcomes and our time varying measure of cultural attitudes, and whether it can be
given a causal interpretation (going from attitudes to outcomes), is the issue we address in the
following sections.
3 Estimation strategy
In the previous section we have discussed the variation across countries and over time of a country
and year speci￿c measure of culture based on the countrynwave e⁄ects in a cross sectional probit
equation for each attitude estimated on individual data for all countries at each point in time. Let
Act denote this survey-based measure of country￿ s c cultural attitudes at time t. We intend to
estimate the e⁄ect of Act on economic outcomes, denoted by Yct, where Yct is determined by the
following equation
Yct = ￿0 + ￿1Yct￿1 + ￿2Act + ￿0
3Xct + ￿c + ￿t + "ct (1)
￿t denote common time e⁄ects. The country speci￿c and the idiosyncratic components of the error
term, ￿c and "ct, are independently distributed across c; and have the standard error component
structure in which E(￿c) = 0; E("ct) = 0; E(￿c"ct) = 0 and E("ct"cs) = 0 for s 6= t). Xct
are other, time-varying variables that may in￿ uence the outcome of interest. They include time
varying institutions, policies and other time varying structural characteristics of a country. For the
purpose of our discussion here we will assume that the variables in Xct are either strictly exogenous
or predetermined, i.e. they are either not correlated with "ct at any time period, or they are not
correlated with contemporaneous or future values of "ct, but may be correlated with its past values.
The latter assumption is more appropriate for policy and institutional variables that may evolve
in response to outcomes and attitudes, but with a lag. Actually, in estimation, we will allow some
labor market policies, such as unemployment bene￿ts, to be a⁄ected immediately by labor market
conditions, but we suppose this is not the case here, purely for ease of exposition.
2002. We will also use data for the 1972-1975 period in models with the lagged dependent variable. See the data
appendix for further details.
9If there is persistence in Yct that goes beyond the one generated by the ￿xed e⁄ect ￿c or the
persistence of the regressors, this justi￿es the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the
equation. This seem a very plausible hypothesis for employment rates and hours. The identi￿cation
problem in estimating (1) arises because attitudes are likely to be correlated with the shock to the
labor market outcome equation (E(Act "ct) 6= 0). As an example, assume that Ac;t is determined
by the following equation
Act = ~ ￿0 +
J P
j=1
~ ￿1jAct￿j + ~ ￿2Yct￿1 + ~ ￿3Yct + ~ ￿0
4Zct + ~ ￿c + ~ ￿t + ~ ￿ct (2)
where Act￿j denotes past attitudes and Zct is a vector of additional explanatory variables. ~ ￿ct
shares the same characteristics of "ct, including lack of serial correlation. The variables in Zct are
institutional and policy variables, as well as other variables that may a⁄ect labor market attitudes,
such as the advances in the technology of contraception and their di⁄usion, the waxing and waning
of broad cultural movements, such as the feminist movement, or of political tendencies towards more
conservative or liberal views. The variables in Zct (like those in Xct) are either strictly exogenous
or predetermined (uncorrelated, in this latter case, with present or future values of ~ ￿ct and "ct).
Equation (2) makes clear that attitudes respond to both present and past labor market out-
comes. Using equation (1) to obtain the reduced form for Act (substituting out Yct), we get
Act = ￿0 +
J P
j=1
￿1jAct￿j + ￿2Yct￿1 + ￿0
3Wct + ￿c + ￿t + ￿ct (3)
where the ￿0s are a function of the e ￿0s and ￿0s. Wct is the union of Zct and Xct: Note that ￿ct is a
linear combination of "ct and ~ ￿ct (￿ct = (~ ￿3"ct + ~ ￿ct)=(1 ￿ ~ ￿3￿2)) and hence is certainly correlated
with "ct; even if ~ ￿ct and "ct are uncorrelated. This is one source of the endogeneity problem we
have referred to and it would not be there if attitudes did not respond to contemporaneous labor
market outcomes. Provided 1 ￿ ~ ￿3￿2 is positive, a positive ~ ￿3 would lead to a positive correlation
between Act and "ct:Non zero correlation between ~ ￿ct and "ct is another source of endogeneity.
It is likely that attitudes measured through survey responses on women role in the family and in
the workplace are e⁄ected not only by past but also by contemporaneous employment experiences.
For instance, high employment rates for women may reinforce the sense that having a role in the
formal labor market is both rewarding and acceptable, and may lessen the perception of motherhood
as a necessary component of ful￿lment.13 Moreover, it is plausible that the unobservables that
lead to a more favorable response towards women working will be positively correlated with the
unobservables that lead to higher women employment rates. Not addressing the endogeneity issues
is likely to lead to an overestimate of the e⁄ect of attitudes towards women in the workplace on
employment outcomes. The possible endogeneity of the attitude variable concerning the importance
of independence as a positive trait for youth is, perhaps, less clear-cut. Even here, however, one
13It is true that we control￿ in the regression generating the country-wave attitude variables￿ for an individual￿ s
employment status. However this is not enough to eliminate the endogeneity problem because individual responses
may be a⁄ected not only by one￿ s experience, but also by aggregate conditions.
10can imagine that a buoyant youth labor market may quickly a⁄ect perceptions. The attitude about
the importance of generous holidays is also very likely to respond to shocks to actual hours of work,
although it is not clear in which direction. Working longer hours may be associated with an increase
in the desire for leisure, through, for instance, an income e⁄ect or due to stress when annual hours
actually worked get closer and closer to the bound represented by the total hours available in one
year. However, if hours and wages are positively associated, longer hours would be associated with
a demand for less leisure, through the substitution e⁄ect.
What can be done to address this endogeneity issue? Equation (2) o⁄ers some suggestions.
Today￿ s attitudes depend upon past attitudes and past outcomes that are not correlated, given
our assumptions, with today￿ s shock to the outcome variable. Moreover, there may be some other,
deeper and slower moving attitudes that evolve over time, but respond only with a lag to economic
outcomes in the labor market, such as religious beliefs and, perhaps the degree of trust.14 These
deeper (or di⁄erent) attitudes are assumed not to have a direct e⁄ect on labor market outcomes.
They are determined by an equation similar to (2), but with the crucial di⁄erence that they respond
to outcomes only with a lag so that the coe¢ cient ~ ￿3 of Yct equals zero. Moreover, it is less likely
that the shocks in the structural equations for these attitudes are correlated with those in the
outcome equation. The contemporaneous values of these deeper attitudinal variables (call them
Ad
ct) can, therefore, be considered predetermined in the outcome equations (E(Ad
cs "ct) = 0 for
s ￿.t): These deeper (or di⁄erent) cultural attitudes are also likely to be correlated with the labor
market attitudes we are investigating, Act, for instance because they share some of the determinants
contained in Zct in equation (3), or because both of them respond to lagged economic outcomes.
Another option, with identical consequences from our point of view, would be to assume that labor
market attitudes are determined by deeper attitudes (i.e.. assuming that Ad
ct is included in Zct)
and to continue to maintain the assumption that the latter are uncorrelated with contemporaneous
labor market shocks.
Using lagged values of attitudes, lagged outcomes, or contemporaneous values of the (prede-
termined) deeper attitudes as instruments in the context of the within estimator of equation (1)
is, however, not legitimate, given the shortness of the panel. Nevertheless, one can use the GMM
di⁄erence estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the system estimator of Blundell
and Bond (1998) to address the endogeneity issue. The system estimator (under the appropriate
assumptions about initial conditions) is an appealing choice if attitudes are persistent. More pre-
cisely we will use appropriately lagged values of the levels of Yct , Act and Ad
ct for the equation in
di⁄erence and of their di⁄erences for the equation in levels. Taking ￿rst di⁄erences of (1) we obtain
￿Yct = ￿1￿Yct￿1 + ￿2￿Act + ￿0
3￿Xct + ￿￿t + ￿"ct (4)
Yct￿j , Act￿j with j ￿ 2 and Ad
ct￿j with j ￿ 1 are legitimate instruments for ￿Yct￿1 and ￿Act,
14Fortin (2008) uses attitudes towards premarital sex as instruments for gender role attitudes. Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2006) employ the percentage of adherents of various religious denominations as an instrument for thrift in
a regression with aggregate saving as the dependent variable in a pooled OLS regression.
11given the serially uncorrelated nature of "ct. The treatment of Xct will depend upon the nature of
the variables. Institutions and policies cannot be treated as strictly exogenous variables: it may be
more plausible to assume that they are endogenous or predetermined, in which case they also need
to be instrumented. We will address this issue in the GMM result section (see Section 6). In the
system estimator the orthogonality conditions for the di⁄erenced equation are augmented by the
orthogonality conditions for the level equation. Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) show that under
appropriate assumptions about the initial conditions, we can use ￿Yct￿1 , ￿Act￿1 , and ￿Ad
ct as
instruments for Yct￿1 and Act in the equation in levels. (1).
Another complementary strategy to address the endogeneity issue is to use the attitudes of
immigrants into the US to instrument for the attitudes in the country of origin (excluding the US).
Algan and Cahuc (2008) use the attitudes of immigrants into the US in a reduced-form framework.
They replace the country-level attitudes for Trust in 2000 and in 1935 with the corresponding
inherited attitudes of second (or higher) generation immigrants in the US. The unobservable
country-level attitudes in 1935 are those inherited by second generation Americans born before
1910, of third generation born before 1935, etc.
Given the assumptions embodied in our model￿ and also given the higher frequency of the ob-
servations for the labor market variables we employ, approximately ten years interval￿ we consider
a di⁄erent approach that still uses information on the attitudes of US immigrants. Basically, we
will use the contemporaneous values of the attitudes of immigrants in the US from a given country
at a given point in time as an instrument for the attitudes of the country of origin at the same time
(as opposed to the inherited attitudes used in Algan and Cahuc, 2008).
More speci￿cally, assume that AUS
ct denotes the country of origin (c) and period (t) component
of attitudes towards gender, youth and leisure, or other attitudes potentially correlated with labor
market attitudes, of ￿rst or higher generation immigrants to the US, after controlling for personal
characteristics. One could include in the sample all immigrants, except those who have come to the
US after 1980, so that none of them has experienced the labor market in the home country during
the period we use for estimation (1980-2000). If one is worried about the possibility is that ￿rst
generation immigrants in the US may maintain close information or family ties with the country
of origin and be a⁄ected by the evolution of attitudes and outcomes there, one can exclude ￿rst
generation immigrants from the sample. We will follow the latter strategy and focus on second or
higher generation immigrants. Assume that their attitudes,AUS
c;t , are determined by:
AUS










ct are additional observable US, time and country of origin speci￿c determinants of US
attitudes. ￿US
c is a time invariant e⁄ect speci￿c to the country of origin. ￿US
t represents a US
speci￿c factor that has a common e⁄ect, independently of country of origin. Finally, ￿US
ct is a
serially uncorrelated random shock.
The ￿rst issue at stake is whether the time evolution of attitudes in the country of origin and
12those of immigrants to the US are correlated. It is plausible to assume that this may be the case
because some of the country-of-origin speci￿c determinants of immigrants attitudes (V US
ct ), are
correlated with the determinants of attitudes in the country of origin (such as Zct or present or
past Yct). This is likely to be the case for variables representing the group speci￿c e⁄ect of broad
cultural or political changes and technological innovations (feminist movement, swings towards
political conservatism, innovation in contraception technology, etc.). For instance, changes in the
contraception technology available are likely to be correlated across countries and to generate
correlated e⁄ects on the attitudes of country c and on the attitudes of immigrants in the US from
country c because they are ￿ltered through a partly common cultural background, even though
law and regulations di⁄er across countries.15 A possible source of concern is that a selection issue
may a⁄ect the emigration decision in the sense that people who left may be those who are more
independent and less attached to the values of the country of origin (Alesina and Glaeser (2004),
Alesina and Giuliano (2007)). Ultimately, the data will suggest whether the evolution of the
attitudes of immigrants into the US is informative about the evolution of attitudes in the country
of origin.
The second issue is whether AUS
ct is uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation
in country c at time t:Clearly AUS
ct is likely to be correlated with the country e⁄ect in the outcome
equation, ￿c, since the latter contains, among other elements, time invariant and country speci￿c
components of culture that are partly transmitted to US immigrants ( and are represented by
￿US
c in (5):However, it is plausible to assume that after conditioning on time varying country
variables, Xct (that will include a country speci￿c measure of business cycle conditions, policies
and institutions) and a common time e⁄ect ￿t, the idiosyncratic shocks to labor market outcomes
in each country, "ct; are not correlated with AUS
ct . Under these assumptions, it is legitimate to use
(in countries other than the US) ￿AUS
ct as an instrument for ￿Act in the di⁄erence equation and
for Act in the level equation.
In any case, in Section 6 we will report the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to
test the lack of correlation between the instruments and the error term in the outcome equations.
In Section 5 we will investigate the correlation between labor market attitudes and the potential
instruments and we will assess their relevance by estimating the appropriate ￿rst stage regressions.
Recall that in the GMM system estimator we have two sets of ￿rst stage regressions: one in
di⁄erences and one in levels. Moreover, when a large number of cross sectional observations are
available, in each ￿rst stage regression one can allow the coe¢ cients to vary in each cross section.
For the equation in di⁄erence, (4), assuming ￿0
3 equal zero for simplicity, the ￿rst stage regression










where further lags of Yct￿2 ; Act￿2 Ad
ct￿1 and AUS
ct could also be included, if available. For the
15Note that US shocks common to all groups, ￿
US
t , provide a time variation in attitudes that is not useful for
instrumenting Act because it is completely absorbed by the period dummy in the outcome equation, ￿t:










We have experimented both with time varying and time invariant coe¢ cients, and we have
settled in favor of the latter option, given the limited number of cross sectional observations at our
disposal.
There is a ￿nal issue we need to address. All the discussion above has been conducted under
the implicit assumption that we can perfectly observe the attitudes towards gender, the young,






ct ; and e AUS
ct = AUS
ct + ￿AUS
ct , whereedenote measured variables and the
￿0s classical serially uncorrelated measurement errors. This would lead to attenuation bias when
the outcome equations are estimated by least squares procedures. In terms of our instrumental
variable procedure we now need to assume that measured deep attitudes or measured attitudes of
US immigrants are not correlated both to the shock to the outcome equation, "ct; as well as with
the measurement error for attitudes towards gender,youth and leisure, ￿A
ct. This requires, among
other things, the measurement errors to be uncorrelated with each other.16
4 Within estimates
In this section we present and discuss a set of results obtained by estimating an equation for the
employment to population ratio for women (epr_w) and youth (epr_y) and for average annual
hours of work (hours), using the Within (or least square dummy variable, LSDV) estimator. The
explanatory variables for epr_w include cultural attitudes towards the need of having children for
a woman to feel realized (women_cn), or towards the priority of male employment when jobs are
scarce (women_jp). The former is available for up to three waves, while the latter is available only
for a maximum of two waves. The variables are derived as the country/wave e⁄ect described in
the previous section and are coded in such a way that increasing values denote a more progressive
attitude towards women For youth employment rates, the cultural variable captures the importance
given to youth independence as a desirable trait (youth_i).
The within (least square dummy variable, LSDV) estimator allows for country speci￿c and time
invariant e⁄ects. Such e⁄ects capture both time invariant cultural traits and time invariant insti-
tutions, in addition to other time invariant country characteristics that may a⁄ect the employment
or hours outcomes. They also control for country speci￿city in interpreting the survey question and
for lack of cross country comparability of the dependent variable. This is not a problem for women
and youth employment rates, but is a potential problem for the hours of work series available.17
16More precisely, when using the attitudes of US immigrants as instruments, for instance, one need to assume lack
of correlation between (i) A
US
ct and "ct; as before, (ii) between ￿
AUS
ct and "ct; and (iii) between ￿
A





ct . Parallel assumptions are required for deep attitudes.
17The OECD warns that the series for hours they have produced and that we are utilizing is homogeneous through
time within each country, but is not comparable across countries. This emphasizes the importance of including a
14The main drawback of the within estimator is the fact that it does not recognize and address the
endogeneity of the cultural variables discussed in the previous section. The latter re￿ ect phenom-
ena unrelated to contemporaneous labor market experience (i.e. the "women revolution" or the
technological improvement in contraception), but are also shaped by contemporaneous experiences
or shocks in the labor market. In other terms, they are almost surely correlated with the stochastic
shock in the employment and hours equations.
Another drawback of the within estimator is that one cannot properly address the issue that
employment and hours outcome are likely to evolve gradually over time This would require the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. Yet, in this case the within
estimator would not yield a consistent estimate of its coe¢ cient, and of the coe¢ cients on the other
variables, even if the latter were strictly exogenous, since the time dimension is small (equal to
three in our case).18
Yet, the within estimates are a useful starting point because they address some of the issues we
are interested in (although not all) and have been used in the paper that is most closely related
to ours, Algan and Cahuc (2007), who analyze the employment rates for women and youth in
OECD countries using three waves of the WSS survey between 1980 and 2000.19 That paper
uses women_jp as the explanatory variable for the equation for women, and the same attitudinal
variable we use for youth (youth_i). Fortin (2005), instead, presents estimates for the women
employment rate in OECD countries in a speci￿cation that also considers multiple waves (roughly
1990, 1995 and 2000), and uses both women_jp and a variable similar to our women_cn (being a
housewife is ful￿lling), but does not include country dummies.
As additional controls we include in the equations "structural" variables, such as women edu-
cation (edu_w), the share of services in value added (serv_va), the fraction of population above 65
(pop_65), the average number of children per woman (children). We also include proxies for (time
varying) policies or labor market institutions, such as unemployment bene￿ts (ben), employment
protection legislation (epl), union density (udens), taxes on labor income (tax_wedge). We also
control for the stage of the business cycle through a measure of the gap between actual and poten-
tial output (gap). In the within regressions these variables are all treated as exogenous, although in
reality they may be correlated with present or past shocks in the outcome equations. The inclusion
of a large menu of structural, institutional and policy variables allows us to isolate the direct e⁄ect
of attitudes on outcomes All equations also include a wave dummy to capture common time e⁄ects.
The results for women employment rates using women_cn as an explanatory variable are re-
ported in Table 2. One main conclusion that can be derived from these results is that the coe¢ cient
of the attitudes variable is signi￿cant in all speci￿cations, although its value tends to decrease some-
what when one adds additional controls. Cultural attitudes about the need of having children for
country ￿xed e⁄ect in the regression.
18See Nickell (1981). In our case we have observations for three periods at ten years intervals for the attitude
variables (from 1980 to 2000) and observations for four periods (from 1970 to 2000) for outcome variables.
19Algan and Cahuc (2005) also analyze the employment rate for older workers as a function of attitudes towards
forcing older workers to retire when jobs are scarce. We do not because the latter variable is only available for the
1990 wave of the WWS and for the 1995 wave for a smaller set of countries.
15a woman to feel fully realized are positively associated with the employment outcomes for women.
We will assess whether this positive association can be given a causal interpretation in the next
section.
We start in column (1) from a simple speci￿cation with only women_cn. We then add gap in
column (2) (and in all remaining columns). In column (3) we add the structure variables, while in
column (4) we add the policy and institutional variables. Column (5) contains both sets of variables,
while in column (6) we report a more parsimonious model containing the more signi￿cant variables
among the structure, policy, and institutional variables.
In most speci￿cation the gap variable is signi￿cantly and positively associated with the women
employment rate, as one would expect. Among the structural variables, the relative size of the
service sector displays a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient, in one speci￿cation, re￿ ecting the rela-
tively greater employment opportunities for women in this sector. Not surprisingly, the coe¢ cient
for the number of children is, instead, always negative and signi￿cant, as well as the percentage
of the population above 65. The e⁄ect of this latter variable could go either way a priory: grand-
parents can provide baby-sitting services, but also may increase the demand for care, that may
fall disproportionately on women. The latter e⁄ect seems to dominate. Employment protection,
the generosity of employment bene￿ts and union density all have a negative and signi￿cant coef-
￿cient in the speci￿cation without the structure variables. Taxes and employment protection are
the only policy variables negatively associated with employment rates in the more general speci-
￿cation including also the structure variables. Surprisingly, women education is not signi￿cant in
this speci￿cation.
The overall impression is that cultural attitudes, policies, institutions, and structure all matter
as determinants of the women employment rate. The e⁄ect of culture decreases, but remains large.
For instance, in the speci￿cation of column (5) an increase from the ￿rst to the third quartile of
the distribution of women_cn is associated with an increase in the employment rate for women
of approximately 5.7 percentage points. This represents a third of the di⁄erence between the ￿rst
and the third quartile of the employment distribution (18.1 percentage points). An increase in
epl from the ￿rst to the third quartile is associated with a decrease of 13.34 percentage points in
epr_w. A similar change in taxation is associated with a decrease in epr_w of approximately 14
percentage points. Finally changes from the ￿rst to the third quartile in the number of children or
the population dependency ratio are associated with a decrease in epr_w of 3 percentage points
each.
Taking these results at face value and comparing them with those in Algan and Cahuc (2007),
one concludes that Algan and Cahuc overstate the dominance of culture as a determinant of the
employment rates of women and understate the role of policies. The direct e⁄ect of culture is
sizeable, but policies matter even more. It is certainly possible that the e⁄ect of culture goes
through policies and institutions, however the direct e⁄ect, while important, is not overwhelming.
Demographic variables are also quantitatively important. In the speci￿cation with the attitudinal
variable based on job priority for men (women_jp), which is the variable actually used by Algan
16and Cahuc, its coe¢ cient is also always signi￿cant (See Table 3). Most of the policy, institution
and structural variables are also signi￿cant.20 However, the model su⁄ers from a severe case of
over￿tting, given the small number of observations, since no data are available for women_jp in
the 80￿ s.21. Therefore, we should attach less weight to this speci￿cation and we will not pursue it
further.
In Table 4 we report the within estimates for the youth employment rate. Attitudes towards
child independence as a positive trait (youth_i) are not signi￿cantly associated with youth employ-
ment rates. In the speci￿cation without controls the coe¢ cient of this variable is actually negative
and signi￿cant, suggesting the presence of speci￿cation or estimation issues. Youth employment
increases signi￿cantly during expansions, and is negatively and signi￿cantly associated with taxa-
tion and (in one speci￿cation) with employment protection legislation. The estimated coe¢ cient
on unemployment bene￿ts is positive and signi￿cant, which is surprising. The negative coe¢ cient
of the education variable probably simply re￿ ects the fact that with higher levels of education,
young adults remain out of the labor market longer. Certainly, there is no support from these
results for the proposition that cultural attitudes are important determinants of youth employment
outcomes￿ and the role of policies presents some puzzling aspects.
Finally, in Table 5 we report the results for hours of work. Listing generous holidays as an
important attribute of a job (holidays) is not signi￿cantly associated with actual annual hours.
In addition to gap, other important variables are employment protection legislation and women
employment rate (both with a negative coe¢ cient). More employment protection is often associated
with restrictions on work hours. Moreover, women are more likely than men to have part time jobs,
which explains the negative sign of epr_w. Finally the association between hours and the relative
importance of the service sector represents is positive. This result could re￿ ect the fact that
the larger the service sector the more likely it is for some groups (students for instance) to work
part-time, thus increasing overall hours worked in the economy.
In terms of the relative quantitative importance of policies, consider that the third quartile of
the distribution of hours is 14.3 percent higher that the ￿rst quartile. An increase in epl from the
￿rst to the third quartile is associated with a decrease of 12 percent in hours of work.
Because of all the econometric issues we have outlined above it is premature to draw any
de￿nitive conclusion from these within regressions. Yet, conditional on structure and policies, our
within result do not lend support to the hypothesis that cultural attitudes play an overwhelming
role in explaining the evolution over time of employment or hours. Gender attitudes appear to be
important for women employment rates, but so are other policy or structural variables.
20An increase in women_jp from the ￿rst to the third quartile is associated with a increase of 4.8 percentage point
in epr_w. An increase in epl from the ￿rst to the third quartile is associated with a decrease of 6.6 percentage points
in epr_w. This is similar to what we have obtained with women_cn.
21Algan and Cahuc (2007) use three waves for the outcome and attitude variable (early 80￿ s, early 1990￿ s and late
1990￿ s), but it is not clear how the data for women_jp for the 80￿ s were obtained, given that the question was only
asked in 1990, 1995 (for a smaller set of countries) and 2000.
175 Choice of instruments
In order to address the endogeneity issues discussed in Section 3, we will use "deeper attitudes" in
the country of residence￿ attitudes towards trust and belief in God￿ and attitudes toward trust,
pre-marital sex and women work among US immigrants, as potential instruments. In order to
assess whether these variables are indeed good instruments we need to check whether they contain
information about attitudes towards women, child independence and the importance of generous
holidays, our proxies for a country￿ s "culture". Ultimately, it will be the data, in the ￿rst stage
regressions, to tell whether the evolution of these variables matters for women_cn, youth_i, and
holidays, but it is useful to start thinking about reasons why such correlations may arise.
Consider ￿rst the attitudes towards trust. It has been suggested that lack of trust is typical of
hierarchical societies.22 A hierarchical structure of society is likely to be associated with an emphasis
on traditional gender roles within the family. Moreover, in hierarchical societies families tend to
be relatively more important, inducing people to engage in more non-market, family centered
activities.23 Finally, in such an environment, citizens may think that they have less control on
their life and that individual e⁄ort is not likely to pay o⁄, leading to a reduced importance of
independence as a desirable characteristic of the young. In addition to trust in the country of
residence, we will also use trust of US immigrants as an instrument.
Consider next the question about beliefs in God and religious beliefs in general. It has been
suggested that religious beliefs may signal more conservative values, among them the idea that
women should be subordinated to men and naturally belong to the home.24 It has also been
suggested that this may be particularly true for Christian traditions with an emphasis on hierarchy,
such as Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy.25Among Protestants, Max Weber￿ s hypothesis
would imply a positive correlation between religious beliefs and work ethic, with more emphasis on
work versus leisure and, possibly, a more favorable view of women employment.26 However, there
is evidence that for Catholics there has been a change in the nature of religious beliefs and their
association with attitudes towards women after Vatican II.27 All this suggests that beliefs in God
or other indices of religiosity are instruments worth exploring, particularly if interacted with the
historically dominant religious a¢ liation of each country.28
Further, consider the question about pre-marital sex among US immigrants. More conservative
values towards premarital sex could signal more importance attached to the role of women in the
22See Ban￿eld (1958) and Tabellini (2008b).
23See Algan and Cahuc (2006).
24Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) present micro evidence that the presence of religious beliefs and their
intensity is associated with less favorable attitudes towards women working.
25See, for instance Luperini et al. (1997) and Archimandrite (1981, p.38).
26Weber (1930).
27See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003).
28It is important to note that our ￿deeper￿ attitudes are time-varying, even if it may take some time for them
to evolve. For instance, beliefs in God (or participation in organized religious activities) can change in response to
economic development (secularization hypothesis) and to changes in competition among religion providers (￿supply-
side￿theory) (see Barro and McClearly (2003)) For a discussion of the determinants of trust see, instead, Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002).
18home relative to their role in the workplace29. Moreover, if more conservative attitudes toward
premarital sex re￿ ect a more traditional and hierarchical society, the e⁄ect on attitudes toward
leisure will be similar to those outlined above when we were discussing the attitudes towards trust.
Finally, answers to the question asked of US immigrants "Do you approve or disapprove of a
married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting
her" are informative about attitudes towards the "male breadwinner" model, and suggest them-
selves as a natural instrument for gender attitudes in the country of residence. 30
In Table 6 we present information about the relevance of these instruments in explaining the
level, or change in women_cn, youth_i, and holidays. We do not report all our experiments and
focus on the more promising ones, or on some of those that are indicative of the challenges one
faces. In the ￿rst part of the table we focus on deeper attitudes in the country of residence. Recall
that these are treated as predetermined variables. In the ￿rst row we present the F ￿ test of
joint signi￿cance of (the country/wave e⁄ects of) belief in God lagged once, interacted with the
historically dominant religious a¢ liation of each country, in a regression of ￿women_cn on the
lagged religious belief variables (God for short) and time dummies. We then report the F ￿ test
obtained in the regression of women_cn on the lagged change of such religious belief variable and
time dummies. The results suggest that beliefs in God are informative for the level of women_cn,
but not for its change. The marginal signi￿cance level of the F ￿ test (in parenthesis) is 0.0021
in the ￿rst case and only 0.287 in the second. Adding to the information reported in the table,
note that an increase in the percentage of believers in historically Catholic countries (there are no
Eastern Orthodox countries in our sample) or in Japan (the only non Catholic or non Protestant
country in our sample) is associated with a signi￿cantly lower level of women_cn, while this is
not the case for the historically Protestant countries. In the third line we repeat the same exercise
for holidays. The results suggest that there is useful information in religious beliefs for the level
and change of holidays, although more for the former than the latter 31. In the equation for the
level of holidays an increase in belief in God in historically Protestant countries is signi￿cantly and
negatively associated with holidays, while there is no signi￿cant association for Catholic countries
(and a positive and signi￿cant one for Japan). The di⁄erence between Catholic and Protestant
countries is broadly consistent with the arguments summarized above. Finally, in the second row
of the table we report the correlation coe¢ cient between youth_i and trust. Lagged values of
trust contain very little information about the level or the change in youth_i. This is just an
29Fortin (2008) uses contemporaneous individual attitudes towards sex and politics in the country of residence as
an instrument for family attitudes in an equation that explains a woman￿ s participation decision in the United States.
We have experimented with the answers to a question in the WWS about the importance of happy sexual relationship
for a marriage, but they did not appear to contain useful information for any of the attitudinal variables we use as
regressors.
30We have also experimented with the attitude of immigrant towards women in politics. The answers to this
variable seem to contain some information about attitudes towards women work in the country of residence, but not
as much as the answers to the questions in the text.
31In the equation for the change in holidays, the low value of the marginal signi￿cance level of the F ￿ test is
entirely due to the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient of the interaction of God with the Japan dummy. Beliefs in God do
not matter for Protestant or Catholic countries.
19example of the di¢ culty of ￿nding deeper attitudes that are correlated with attitudes towards child
independence.
In the second part of Table 6, we study the correlation of attitudes in the various countries
with those of US immigrants from the same countries: imm_fework denotes the attitude towards
women working even when the husband could support her, imm_sex denotes the attitude towards
pre-marital sex. The answers are coded so that higher values of these variables re￿ ect more liberal
attitudes. Recall that changes in the attitude of immigrants are treated as exogenous in both
the level and di⁄erence outcome equations. We report the relevant correlation coe¢ cients, after
partialling out the e⁄ect of time dummies. Both ￿imm_fework and ￿imm_sex are positively
and signi￿cantly associated with the change in women_cn, but not with its level. Change in
immigrant trust is negatively and almost signi￿cantly associated with the level youth_i. Changes
in imm_trust and imm_sex are signi￿cantly associated (at around the 5% level) with the change
and level of holidays.
Summarizing, the ￿rst set of instruments (deeper attitudes) contain useful information to es-
timate the level equations for epr_w and hours. The attitudes of US immigrants contains useful
information for the di⁄erence equation for epr_w and hours, and for the level equation of the latter
variable. Finding appropriate attitudinal instruments for youth_i remains an open issue.
In the last part of Table 6 we report the F ￿ test for the ￿rst stage regressions containing
both the deeper attitudes, the attitude of US immigrants and lagged outcomes (details on exact
variables included is contained in the table). The (lagged) outcome variable is included to capture
the idea that attitudes can be a⁄ected by outcomes. The results con￿rm that the instruments
for our measure of gender attitudes and of attitudes towards holidays are informative both in the
level and di⁄erence equation, while it is very hard to ￿nd relevant instruments for our measure
of attitudes towards youth independence, particularly for the di⁄erence equation. Increases in
past level of epr_w are positively and signi￿cantly associated (at the 5% level) with more liberal
attitudes (in levels) towards women. Past increases in hours work have a positive e⁄ect (signi￿cant
at the 10% level) in the ￿rst stage regression for the level of holidays, suggesting that working
longer hours is associated with a greater desire for leisure, through, for instance, an income e⁄ect
or due to stress.
6 GMM estimates
In Table 7 we present the GMM estimates of the equation for women￿ s employment rate. In columns
(1) through (7) we use the system estimator with belief in God (interacted with the historically
prevalent religious a¢ liation, and appropriately lagged) plus ￿imm_fework and ￿imm_sex as
instruments, in addition to the appropriately lagged values of epr_w and women_cn (and of the
additional regressors). Relative to the idiosyncratic component of the error term, gap, ben, ser_va
and children are treated as endogenous, edu_w, tax_wed, udens and epl, as predetermined, and
pop65 as exogenous. Given the limited number of observations we have constrained the coe¢ cients
20of the ￿rst stage regression to be equal across the three waves. For the same reason, we have used
only the shortest lag allowed for each variable as instrument. The results suggest that women_cn
remains a signi￿cant determinant of the evolution of women employment rates in all speci￿cations,
even when instrumented. Another result of note is that there is substantial persistence in the
evolution of epr_w, as suggested by the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable (around 0.8).
Interestingly, labor market policies and structural variables are also signi￿cant determinants of
the evolution over time of women employment rates. In our preferred parsimonious speci￿cation
reported in column (7), and obtained from imposing restrictions on the more general speci￿cation
of column (6), both employment protection legislation and the number of children have a negative
e⁄ect.
The p ￿ value of the test of overidentifying restrictions is not suggestive of misspeci￿cation.
However, the test of ￿rst order serial correlation suggests that the residuals (in di⁄erence) are white
noise, which is consistent with the idiosyncratic shock in the equation in level being a random walk.
If that were the case, lagged di⁄erences of predetermined or endogenous variables would not be
legitimate instruments for the equation in levels and the use of the system estimator would be
inappropriate in this case. For this reason, in columns (8) through (9) we present a set of results in
which the di⁄erence estimator does not su⁄er from this problem. 32 Column (8) contains the most
general model. Column (9) retains the policy and structural variables that are more signi￿cant in
the general model, while column (10) contains the same variables of column (7) for comparison and
robustness.
The coe¢ cient of women_cn remains signi￿cant, as it was in the Within estimates. Among
the policy and structure variables, employment protection, the number of children, and now the
size of the service sector, all display a signi￿cant negative coe¢ cient. Summarizing, it appears that
attitudes, some institutions (employment protection in particular), and some structural variables
(number of children and size of the service sector) all play an important role in determining women
employment rates.33 In assessing the quantitative implication of the model, one must now di⁄eren-
tiate between impact and long run e⁄ects. However, the relative importance of the direct e⁄ect of
attitudes and institutions does not depend on this choice. Using the long run multipliers, a change
in our measure of attitudes from the ￿rst to the third quartile generates a change in women employ-
ment rates of 17.1 percentage points, while a similar change in employment protection legislation
results in an increase of 18.6 percentage points. Both changes are large and lead us to conclude
that both policies and culture matter. There is, therefore, at least the potential for policies to o⁄set
the e⁄ect of variation in attitudes. Whether the required changes in policies are feasible is an issue
32In estimating the di⁄erenced model, if the di⁄erence of the error term was serially uncorrelated, we could advance
all lagged instruments by one period. We have tried this, but with no improvement in the results, so we have decided
not to change the timing of the instruments. We have, however, excluded religious attitudes as an instrument because
it contains no information about changes in attitude towards women work in the country of residence.
33Experiments in which we replaced the belief in God, as an instrument, with the degree of religious participation
(measured by (at least) weekly attendance at religious services) yield similar results concerning the e⁄ects of cul-
ture, policies and structure. The only exception is that unemployment bene￿ts are now positively and signi￿cantly
associated with women employment rates, which is puzzling.
21we do not address in this paper.
As we have already discussed, culture could a⁄ect outcomes indirectly, through the e⁄ect it
has on policies and institutions. For instance, societies characterized by a more traditional view of
gender roles could set up policies and institutions to protect the male bread winner model through
employment protection legislation that is likely to be more bene￿cial for primary workers in formal
sectors, the majority of whom are likely to be men34. If this were the case our estimate of the e⁄ect
of culture on women employment rates would capture only the direct e⁄ect of culture and would
thus be downward biased.
In fact, if we look at the overall correlation coe¢ cient between women_cn and epl, controlling
for time dummies, it is (consistently with the discussion above) negative (-0.4) and signi￿cant at
the 1% level, when we use current women_cn, and negative (-0.38) and signi￿cant at 5%, when we
use lagged women_cn. However, there is no information in the evolution over time of women_cn
for the evolution in epl within countries (the correlation is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
after introducing country ￿xed e⁄ects or running the regression in di⁄erences). All the correlation
is cross sectional.35 Moreover, deeper attitudes or the attitudes of US immigrants do not matter
in the ￿rst stage regression of epl. Hence, there is no evidence of an indirect e⁄ect of changes in
attitudes (or in their exogenous component) on women employment rates, through their e⁄ect on
the evolution of labor market policies.
Next we turn to Table 8 where we repeat a similar exercise for the youth employment rate. Recall
that there was no association between the attitude towards child independence and employment
outcomes in the LSDV estimator. Instrumenting for youth_i using trust in the country of residence
and of US immigrants as additional instruments, yields little support for the importance of attitudes
towards child independence for youth employment rates. Even if we focus on the results obtained
using the system estimator (columns (1) through (7)), in just one case (column (6)) youth_i displays
a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient. Policies do not appear to matter much either in the GMM
estimates. Probably, the di¢ culty in ￿nding adequate instruments does not allow us to pin down
the e⁄ect of culture and policies on youth employment rates.
Finally in Table 9 we present the GMM estimates for the (log) hours of work. We report only the
GMM system estimates because, the Arellano_Bond test of ￿rst-order serial correlation suggests
that the idiosyncratic component of the error term is not serially correlated in the level equation
(and hence is MA(1) in the di⁄erence equation). 36 The big di⁄erence relative to the Within
estimates is that now the coe¢ cient of holidays is negative and signi￿cant: considering holidays
an important attribute of a job results in lower average hours of work. However, policies are also
34See Algan and Cahuc (2006) for a discussion of the e⁄ect of religious a¢ liation on employment protection.
35Alesina et al.(2009), using a larger set of countries, also ￿nd a positive cross sectional correlation between cultural
attitudes (importance of family ties, both actual and inherited) and various measures of labor market regulation.
Using micro data they also ￿nd a positive correlation between family ties and the desire for employment protection,
whether or not one includes country ￿xed e⁄ects.
36For instance, in columns (6) and (7) the test suggests that we can reject the hypothesis that the di⁄erence of
the error term is white noise at or close to the 5% level. The test of overidentifying restrictions is not indicative of
misspeci￿cation.
22important. Contrary to the Within results, now the policy variables more robustly associated with
hours of work are tax-wedge and ben. A wider tax wedge or more generous unemployment bene￿ts
lead to lower hours worked on average in a country. An increase in the wedge from the ￿rst to
the third quartile results in a decrease in hours work of 6.2 % , while a similar increase in bene￿ts
results in a 1.8% drop. A change in attitudes towards generous holidays from the ￿rst to the
third quartile leads to a 5.5% drop. These are sizeable e⁄ects, particularly those for tax-wedge and
holidays (recall that the di⁄erence from the ￿rst to the third quartile of hours is 14.3%). Union
density is also signi￿cantly and negatively associated with average hours, which is what we would
expect, given the push of unions in many countries to restrict hours of work. Finally, as for the
within estimates, a higher fraction of women in the labor force is negatively associated with hours
of work, while the association with the relative size of the service sector is positive.37 The bottom
line is that in the case of hours worked too, both policies and attitudes matter.
Also in this case there is there is no evidence that contemporaneous or past changes in changes
in attitudes (holidays) are correlated with changes in policies (tax-wedge and ben) However, in the
￿rst stage regression for ￿tax-wedge there is information in some of the cultural instruments. For
instance, ￿tax-wedge is negatively and signi￿cantly associated at the 5% level with ￿imm_trust
and positively and signi￿cantly associate at the 10% level with ￿imm_sex. In this case, an evolution
in the exogenous component of cultural attitudes has both a direct and indirect e⁄ect on hours
worked, the latter coming through its e⁄ect on taxes (there is no indirect e⁄ect, though, through
the unemployment bene￿t variable). However, the thought experiment of changing , for instance,
the tax wedge (or, more precisely, the component not related to culture) to o⁄set the e⁄ect on
hours worked of variations in attitudes, is still possible.
7 Conclusions
We have studied whether cultural attitudes towards work, gender and the young are a signi￿cant
determinant of the evolution over time of the employment rates of women and of the young, and of
hours worked in OECD countries. Beyond controlling for a larger menu of policies, institutions and
other structural characteristics of the economy than has been done so far, our analysis improves
upon existing studies of the role of "culture" on economic outcomes by dealing explicitly with the
endogeneity of attitudes, policies and institutions, and by allowing for the persistent nature of labor
market outcomes.
By using panel data on labor market outcomes, attitudes, policies and institutions, we were
able to separate the time-invariant e⁄ect of these variables (which cannot be identi￿ed because it
is captured by country ￿xed e⁄ects) from those e⁄ects that are associated with their time-varying
components. We ￿nd that, even after instrumenting, allowing for persistence of outcomes and for
an extensive menu of additional controls, culture still matters. More speci￿cally, attitudes towards
37Experiments in which we replace the belief in God with the degree of religious participation give less sharp
results on the e⁄ect of culture, probably because frequency of attendance at religious services is less informative
about attitudes towards leisure than beliefs in God in the ￿rst stage regression.
23a woman￿ s role in the family and towards leisure are statistically and economically important
determinants of the employment rate of women and of average hours worked, respectively. However,
we ￿nd that policies and other institutional or structural characteristics also matter. The results
on the role of attitudes towards leisure, policies and institutions in determining the evolution over
time of hours worked are new and particularly interesting in the light of the debate initiated by
Prescott (2004) and Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005).
In the case of women employment rates, the policy variable that is signi￿cant along with at-
titudes, is the OECD index of employment protection legislation. For hours worked the policy
variables that play a role, along with attitudes, are the tax wedge and bene￿ts. The quantita-
tive impact of these policy variables (in particular, employment protection legislation and taxes)
is large, so that changes in policies have at least the potential to undo the e⁄ect of variations in
cultural traits on labor market outcomes.
We have used as instruments deeper attitudes in the country of residence and the attitudes of
US immigrants, grouped by country of origin. Other instruments could be investigated in future
work. For instance, following Giuliano (2007), the living arrangements of American immigrants
could be used as an instrument for attitudes toward the young. Another interesting extension
would require exploiting the variation over time in work attitudes and employment outcomes at
the regional level in Europe. All this is on our research agenda for the future.
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27A Data Appendix: sources and de￿nitions
A.1 Employment and hours
For most countries the employment and hours variables represent four year averages over the period
1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2002. We will also use data for the 1972-1975 period in models with
the lagged dependent variable. See Table A.1 for summary statistics on the main variables used in
our econometric work.
epr_w Employment/Population ratio for Women.
De￿nition: Proportion of an economy￿ s female population aged 25-54 that is employed. Source:
OECD Labour Force Statistics. Updated in July 2008
Data adjustments: Austria: For the period 1990-1993 we used the observation in 1994 from
OECD Labour Force Statistics. Belgium, Denmark: For the period 1972-1975 we used the E/P
ratios estimates for women aged 25-54 years obtained using the following procedure. We started
from the formula E/P=(E/LF)*(LF/P) where P is population of the relevant sex and age group, LF
labor force, E employed in civilian employment and armed forced. We took the average LF/P, E and
LF of women aged 15-64 between ￿ 72 and ￿ 75 and ￿ 81 and ￿ 84 from OECD Labor Force Statistics
1969-1989. We calculate the growth rate between these two periods and project backward our
1981-1984 ￿gure for the employment/population ratio for women. Canada : For the period 1972-
1975 we used the E/P ratios estimates for women aged 25-54 years obtained using the following
procedure: we started from the formula E/P= LF/P ￿U/P = LF/P ￿ U/LF * LF/P, where P is
population of the relevant sex and age group, LF labor force and U unemployment, so that LF/P
is the participation rate and U/LF is the unemployment rate. We took the average LF/P and
U/LF of women aged 25-54 between ￿ 72 and ￿ 75 and ￿ 81 and ￿ 84 from OECD Labor Force Statistics
1969-1989. We calculated the growth rate between these two periods and projected backward
our 1981-1984 ￿gure for the employment/population ratio for women. Portugal : For the period
1972-1975 we used the average of the E/P ratios for women aged 25-54 years in 1974 and 1975.
United-Kingdom: For the period 1981-1984 we used the observation in 1984 from OECD Labour
Force Statistics. (Updated July 2008). For the period 1972-1975 we followed the same procedure
explained for Canada.
epr_y Employment/Population ratio for Young.
De￿nition: Proportion of an economy￿ s population aged 15-24 that is employed. Source: OECD
Labour Force Statistics. Updated July 2008
Data adjustments: Austria: For the period 1972-1975 we used the E/P ratios estimates for
youth aged 15-24 years for the Census years 1971. For the period 1981-1984 we used the E/P
ratios estimates for youth aged 15-24 years for the Census years 1981. The estimates were derived
using registered unemployment data by age and gender obtained from the OECD. For the period
1990-1993 we used the observation in 1994 from OECD Labour Force Statistics. (updated in July
2008).Belgium, Denmark: We followed the same procedure explained for epr_w, except that since
the ￿gures for men and women aged 15-24 were not available from OECD Labor Force Statistics,
we had to apply the rate of growth of employment/population ratios of men and women aged 15-64.
Canada : We followed the same procedure explained for epr_w. Portugal : We followed the same
procedure explained for epr_w. United-Kingdom: We followed the same procedure explained for
epr_w.
hours Average annual hours actually worked per worker
28De￿nition: Total number of hours worked over the year divided by the average number of people
in employment. Hours actually worked per person in employment are consistent with National
Accounts concepts for Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Norway,
Spain, Sweden. Secretariat estimates for annual hours worked based on the European Labour Force
Survey are used for Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal . The OECD warns that the
data are intended for comparisons of trends over time and are unsuitable for comparisons of the
level of average annual hours of work for a given year, because of di⁄erences in their sources, even
within the ￿rst group of countries. Part-time workers are covered as well as full-time. Country
speci￿c notes can be found at: www.oecd.org/employment/outlook. Source: OECD Labour Force
Statistics
A.2 Attitudes in the country of residence
List of countries with indication of the year of the survey for each available wave. Austria: 2nd
wave 1990, 3rd wave 1999. Belgium: 1st 1981 , 2nd 1990 , 3rd 1999. Canada: 1st 1982, 2nd 1990,
3rd 2000. Denmark: 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Finland: 2nd 1990, 3rd 2000. France: 1st 1981,
2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Germany: 1st 1981 (West Germany), 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Great Britain: 1st
1981 , 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Ireland: 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Italy: 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd
1999. Japan 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd 2000. Netherlands: 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Norway 1st
1982, 2nd 1990. Portugal: 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. Spain: 1st 1981, 2nd 1990, 3rd 2000. Sweden: 1st
1982, 2nd 1990, 3rd 1999. United States: 1st 1982, 2nd: 1990, 3rd 1999. Note : women_cn is not
available for Sweden 1st wave. women_jp is only available for 2nd and 3rd wave.
women_cn The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Do you think
that a woman has to have children in order to be ful￿lled or is this not necessary?￿ 0 denotes
￿ Necessary￿ , 1 denotes ￿ Not Necessary￿- See Table 1. Source: World and European Values Surveys
(four waves integrated ￿les: 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006). The World Values Survey Association
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org)and European Values Study Foundation (www.europeanvalues.nl).
women_jp The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Do you agree or
disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a
job than women?￿0 denotes agreement with the questions, 1 denotes disagreement ￿see Table 1.
Source: World and European Values Surveys
youth_i The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Here is a list of
qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you consider to be
especially important?Independence.￿1 denotes independence being mentioned, 0 not mentioned -
See Table 1. Source: World and European Values Surveys
holidays The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Here are some more
aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones
you personally think are important in a job￿1 denotes generous holidays being mentioned, 0 not
mentioned - See Table 1. Source: World and European Values Surveys
god The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Which, if any, of the
following do you believe in? God￿ Source: World and European Values Surveys
trust The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can￿ t be too careful in dealing with
29people?￿1 denotes the answer "Most People can be trusted", 0 denotes ￿Can￿ t be too careful￿and
￿Don￿ t know￿ . Source: World and European Values Surveys
week The country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses "Apart from weddings,
funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" 1 denotes
the answers ￿ More than once a week￿and ￿ Once a week￿ ; 0 denotes the other alternatives (￿ Once
a month, ￿ Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days￿ , ￿ Other speci￿c holy days￿ , ￿ Once a
year￿ , ￿ Less often￿ , ￿ Never, practically never￿ ). Source: World and European Values Surveys
A.3 Attitudes of second (or higher) generation immigrants in US
imm_fework The cluster/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Do you approve
or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband
capable of supporting her?" 1 denotes disagreement, 0 agreement. The probit model for the ￿rst
wave is run over the period before 1985, for the second wave over the period 1986 -1993 and for
the third wave over the period after 1994. The clusters are: 1.Irish (Ireland) 2. Japanese (Japan).
3.British (England & Wales) 4.Canadian (French Canada-Other Canada) 5. German Speaking
(Germany-Austria) 6.European Continental not German Speaking (Belgium, France, Netherlands)
7.Mediterranean (Italy, Spain, Portugal) 8.Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) Source:
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS.
imm_premarsx The cluster/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿There￿ s been
a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a
man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always
wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?" 1 denotes "wrong only sometimes, or not
wrong at all", 0 "always wrong, almost always wrong". Periods for each wave and Clusters - see
imm_fework. Source: GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS
imm_ trust The cluster/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses ￿Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can￿ t be too careful in dealing
with people?￿1 denotes the answer "Most People can be trusted", 0 denotes ￿Can￿ t be too careful￿
and ￿Don￿ t know￿ . Periods for each wave and Clusters - see imm_fework. Source: GENERAL
SOCIAL SURVEYS
A.4 Labour market policies
ben Average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate
De￿nition: average unemployment bene￿t replacement rate across two income situations (100%
and 67% of APW earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in
work) and three di⁄erent unemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, and 4th and 5th
years of unemployment).Source: OECD, Bene￿ts and Wages Database. Data adjustments: original
data are available only for odd years. Data for even years are obtained by linear interpolation.
tax_wedge Tax wedge on labour use
De￿nition: share of personal income tax and all social security contributions (net of social
bene￿ts) to total labour cost (wages and employers￿social security contributions) and averaged
over two family types (single household and a couple with a dependent spouse and two children,
both family types earning 100% of an average worker income). Source: OECD, Taxing Wages.
30epl Employment Protection Legislation (epl)
De￿nition: OECD summary indicator of the stringency for Employment Protection Legislation
for inde￿nite contract (regular) workers and ￿xed-term contract (temporary) workers, measured
as a simple average of the index for inde￿nite and ￿xed-term contracts. Information on regular
contracts include procedural inconveniences that employers face when trying to dismiss a worker;
notice and several payments at di⁄erent job tenures; and prevailing standards of and penalties for
unfair dismissals. Information on ￿xed-term and temporary work agency contracts include: the
objective reasons under which they can be o⁄ered; the maximum number of successive renewals;
and the maximum cumulated duration of the contract.
A.5 Labour market institutions
udens Union density
De￿nition: trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers a¢ liated to a trade union, in %.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004.
A.6 Other variables
gap Output gap
De￿nition: OECD measure of the gap between actual and potential output as a percentage of
potential output. Source: OECD (2005) Economic Outlook 77.
serv_va Services, etc., value added (% of GDP).
They include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants),
transport, and government, ￿nancial, professional, and personal services such as education, health
care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties,
and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from
rescaling. Source: World Development Indicators
edu_w Female education
De￿nition: number of years of education of female population aged 25 and over.
Source: Barro, R. J. and J-W. Lee (2000). Data adjustments as in Bassanini A., Duval R.
(2006).
children Number of children per woman
De￿nition: ratio of total population aged 0-14 to female population aged 15-64.
Source: OECD, Annual Labour Force Statistics.
edu_y Relative youth education:
De￿nition: di⁄erence between the number of education years of total population aged 15 and
over and the number of education years of total population aged 25 and over. Source: Barro, R. J.
and J-W. Lee (2000). Data adjustments as in Bassanini A., Duval R. (2006).
pop65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total).
Source: World Development Indicators
prot dummy variable, equal to 1 if the adherence fraction of population in 1900 for
protestant religion is greater than that of any other religion , 0 otherwise. Source: Barro and
McCleary (2003)
31cath dummy variable, equal to 1 if the adherence fraction of population in 1900 for catholic
religion is greater than that of any other religion , 0 otherwise. Source: Barro and McCleary (2003)
oth_rel dummy variable, equal to 1 if the greatest adherence fraction of population in 1900
is not for protestant religion, nor for catholic religion , 0 otherwise. Source: Barro and McCleary
(2003)
323334Table 1: Estimations of Family and Work Attitudes : Probit Estimates for 2000 Wave
(1) (2) (3) (4)
child necessary job priority for men important child qualities:indep. important in a job:gen.holidays
sex -0.158*** -0.146*** -0.200*** 0.0530
(0.0557) (0.0388) (0.0403) (0.0328)
age 0.0110** -0.00438 0.0158*** -0.000339
(0.00461) (0.00642) (0.00606) (0.00380)
age2 -0.000152*** -0.0000378 -0.000218*** -0.0000498
(0.0000468) (0.0000624) (0.0000542) (0.0000368)
edu_age 0.0386*** 0.0802*** 0.0390*** -0.0224***
(0.00582) (0.00704) (0.00523) (0.00746)
children -0.0859*** -0.0318*** -0.000828 0.00219
(0.0136) (0.00708) (0.00862) (0.00877)
married -0.0677** -0.119*** -0.0477 -0.0444
(0.0314) (0.0340) (0.0318) (0.0321)
employed 0.0615 0.217** 0.0363 0.0270
(0.0690) (0.0887) (0.0563) (0.0554)
no_workforce 0.0103 0.0730 -0.0374 0.0435
(0.0701) (0.0931) (0.0476) (0.0666)
low -0.0712** -0.0922*** -0.0287 -0.0523***
(0.0309) (0.0316) (0.0309) (0.0201)
high 0.0583** 0.177*** 0.0922*** 0.0131
(0.0296) (0.0333) (0.0223) (0.0262)
left 0.0842 0.0471 0.106*** 0.0895*
(0.0611) (0.0413) (0.0359) (0.0540)
right -0.119*** -0.253*** -0.188*** -0.0778**
(0.0292) (0.0465) (0.0475) (0.0340)
cath 0.140 -0.183 -0.193 0.0506
(0.141) (0.146) (0.149) (0.221)
prot 0.376** -0.189 -0.0775 0.0311
(0.154) (0.142) (0.144) (0.232)
muslim -0.781*** -0.565*** -0.399** 0.0503
(0.274) (0.219) (0.165) (0.329)
other_rel 0.198 -0.184 -0.148 -0.000839
(0.173) (0.168) (0.149) (0.222)
Observations 11904 13242 13423 13379
Country E⁄ects YES*** YES*** YES*** YES***
Clustered errors in parentheses(allowing for arbitrary correlations within countries) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Omitted Categories : Unemployed, Medium Income, Pol.Views:Center, No Religion. In columns 1 and 2, 0 denotes agreement
with the questions 1 denotes disagreement. In column 3, 1 denotes independence being mentioned; 0 not mentioned
In column 4, 1 denotes generous holidays being mentioned; 0 not mentioned
35Table 2: Family and Work Attitudes and Employment Rates for Women:
(using women_cn): Within Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w
women_cn 11.97*** 9.096** 7.989** 10.48*** 7.529** 5.066*
(4.437) (4.351) (3.680) (3.655) (2.947) (3.063)
gap 0.827** 0.385 0.675** 0.466* 0.457*
(0.345) (0.362) (0.285) (0.273) (0.269)














tax_wedge -0.412 -0.759*** -1.056***
(0.280) (0.255) (0.215)
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects and Country E⁄ects are entered in every column
women_cn is the country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses: -Do you think that
a woman has to have children in order to be ful￿lled or is this not necessary?
1 means ￿ not necessary￿ , 0 ￿ needs children￿- See Table 1
36Table 3: Family and Work Attitudes and Employment Rates for Women
(using women_jp): Within Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w
women_jp 59.43*** 58.20*** 31.34* 37.94*** 26.13*** 28.52***
(16.96) (17.27) (16.18) (13.19) (7.830) (7.868)
gap 0.132 -0.0598 0.296 -1.160*** -0.848***
(0.367) (0.638) (0.257) (0.373) (0.307)
children -68.16*** -87.41*** -73.32***
(17.29) (13.03) (8.559)
serv_va 0.329 -0.559** -0.546**
(0.489) (0.245) (0.252)
pop65 -0.871 -2.200*** -1.451***
(0.982) (0.706) (0.476)
edu_w -5.546** -5.700*** -5.535***
(2.331) (1.157) (1.185)




ben 0.155 0.270*** 0.211***
(0.133) (0.0878) (0.0793)
tax_wedge -1.490*** -1.592*** -1.562***
(0.278) (0.156) (0.159)
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects and Country E⁄ects are entered in every column
women_jp is the country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses: -Do you agree or disagree
with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women
0 denotes agreement 1 disagreement - See Table 1
37Table 4: Family and Work Attitudes and Employment Rates for Youth: Within Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y
youth_i -9.984** -6.125 -5.047 -4.527 -5.172 -3.758
(5.015) (4.489) (4.668) (3.566) (3.589) (3.562)
gap 1.469*** 1.608*** 1.579*** 1.357*** 1.488***
(0.382) (0.432) (0.320) (0.367) (0.314)
serv_va 0.245 -0.295
(0.376) (0.310)






ben 0.362** 0.339** 0.392***
(0.156) (0.150) (0.151)
tax_wedge -1.487*** -1.629*** -1.546***
(0.290) (0.294) (0.287)
Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects and Country E⁄ects are entered in every column
youth_i is the country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses: -Here is a list of qualities
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you consider to be especially important?
1 denotes independence being mentioned, 0 not mentioned - See Table 1
38Table 5: Family and Work Attitudes and Log Average Annual Hours: Within Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hours hours hours hours hours hours
holidays -0.0190 -0.0182 -0.0236 -0.000561 -0.00613 -0.0148
(0.0225) (0.0222) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0177) (0.0174)
gap 0.00347 0.00758** 0.00664** 0.0113*** 0.0110***
(0.00300) (0.00305) (0.00296) (0.00294) (0.00288)
serv_va 0.00260 0.00382* 0.00432*
(0.00246) (0.00227) (0.00224)
epr_w -0.00363*** -0.00332*** -0.00325***
(0.000967) (0.000946) (0.000866)








Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects and Country E⁄ects are entered in every column
holidays is the country/wave ￿xed e⁄ect in the probit model that uses: -Here are some
more aspects of a job that people say are important.Please
look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job
1 denotes generous holidays being mentioned, 0 not mentioned - see Table 1
39Table 6: Relevance of Instuments for Attitudes
DEEP ATTITUDES
￿women_cnt;godt￿1 F=1.33 (.287) women_cnt;￿godt F=6.57 (.0021)
￿youth_it;trustt￿1 r=.161 (.395) youth_it;￿trustt r=.387 (.035)
￿holidayst;godt￿1 F=5.39 (.006) holidayst;￿godt F=105.76 (.0000)
US IMMIGRANTS ATTITUDES
￿women_cnt;￿imm_feworkt r=.408 (.035) women_cnt;￿imm_feworkt r=.014 (.941)
￿women_cnt;￿imm_premarsxt r=.423 (.028) women_cnt;￿imm_premarsxt r=.22 (.242)
￿young_it;￿imm_trustt r= -.146 (.460) youth_it;￿imm_trustt r= -.34 (.061)
￿holidayst;￿imm_trustt r= -.0384 (.048) holidayst;￿imm_trustt r= -.345 (.067)
￿holidayst;￿imm_premarsxt r= -.376 (.053) holidayst;￿imm_premarsxt r= -.367 (.050)
1st-STAGES REGRESSIONS
di⁄ eq. level eq.
women_cn F=6.74 (.002) F=15.40 .(000)
youth_i F=1.04 (.367) F=11.45 .(000)
holidays F=8.80 (.001) F=54.30 .(000)
r denotes the correlation coe¢ cient. F denotes the F-Test of signi￿cance of the instruments.
Marginal probabilities in parentheses.
god denotes the interaction of beliefs in God with the historically dominant religious a¢ liation of the country(prot, cath, other)
Time dummies always included.
Each ￿rst-stage regression refers to the speci￿cation containing only the attitudinal variable and the lagged outcome
40Table 7: GMM Estimates for Women Employemt Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w epr_w
w_cn 7.474 4.860*** 4.055*** 3.074*** 5.045*** 3.812*** 4.527*** 5.446 6.371** 11.37**
(4.784) (0.948) (1.006) (0.934) (1.570) (1.111) (1.576) (3.531) (3.208) (4.554)
leprw 0.811*** 0.828*** 0.835*** 0.775*** 0.825*** 0.756*** 0.610 0.628*** 0.848***
(0.166) (0.122) (0.102) (0.0676) (0.0584) (0.0743) (0.560) (0.211) (0.174)
gap 1.489** 1.852*** 1.399*** 1.571*** 1.427*** 0.941 1.370* 1.143***
(0.633) (0.527) (0.390) (0.417) (0.384) (0.944) (0.773) (0.389)
ben 0.104* 0.0940** 0.0807 -0.401 -0.483
(0.0608) (0.0399) (0.0569) (0.255) (0.379)
taxw 0.0238 0.0590 0.00806
(0.127) (0.133) (0.654)
uden -0.0436 -0.0410 0.178
(0.0696) (0.0679) (0.333)
epl -1.013 -1.847 -1.898* -9.710** -8.518** -9.466**
(0.779) (1.187) (0.985) (3.855) (3.894) (3.918)
po65 -0.290 0.272 -2.517* -1.953
(0.416) (0.481) (1.471) (1.202)
eduw 0.0600 -0.301 -3.088
(0.397) (0.510) (5.288)
serv 0.207 -0.0849 1.312* 1.166*
(0.250) (0.200) (0.746) (0.651)
childr -32.90*** -28.11*** -39.35*** -86.67*** -73.88*** -42.80***
(9.603) (8.968) (11.17) (32.78) (16.49) (9.353)
Obs 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 27 27 27
AR1z 1.671 1.998 1.841 1.243 0.847 0.568 0.599 -0.673 -0.538 0.474
HaPv 0.576 0.304 0.814 0.990 0.874 1.000 0.977 0.251 0.597 0.448
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects are entered in every columns
Columns 1 to 7 report the system estimator results using religious beliefs of the country of residence
(treated as predeterminate) and attitudes towards female work and sex of American immigrants
(treated as exogenous) as additional instruments.
Columns 8 to 10 report the di⁄erence estimator results using attitudes towards female work
and sex of American immigrants as additional instruments
In all equations appropriately legged included variables are used as instruments.
gap, ben, serv_va, children treated as endogenous, pop65 as exogenous. edu_w, tax_wed, udens and epl as prederminate
For all variables only the shortest allowable lag is used as instrument.
41Table 8: GMM Estimates for Youth Employemt Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y epr_y
youth_i 11.76** 5.915 4.798 4.870 5.824 5.065 6.938*** -8.000 -13.81
(5.471) (3.830) (3.214) (3.795) (3.905) (4.601) (2.534) (7.186) (13.19)
l_epr_y 0.621*** 0.715*** 0.623*** 0.649*** 0.655*** 0.627*** 0.317 0.138
(0.157) (0.0896) (0.142) (0.131) (0.170) (0.117) (0.219) (0.241)
gap 0.386 1.802*** 1.299 2.735*** 2.134 1.638 3.175
(1.004) (0.556) (1.051) (0.898) (1.422) (1.212) (1.982)
ben 0.494* -0.0269 0.101
(0.266) (0.310) (0.863)
tax_wedge -0.160 0.245 -0.446
(0.572) (0.535) (1.164)
udens 0.00823 -0.0556 -0.530
(0.177) (0.120) (0.870)
epl -2.775 -3.438** -2.417 -3.423 -1.899
(2.566) (1.708) (1.993) (7.928) (5.282)
edu_y -0.830 -1.955 -11.20
(3.549) (5.911) (17.83)
serv_va 1.064 1.639** 1.372** 0.139 1.382
(0.799) (0.768) (0.611) (1.434) (2.417)
Obs 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 28 28
AR(1)z-st 0.589 -0.772 -1.368 -1.144 -2.004 -1.140 -1.578 -0.601 0.150
HansenPv 0.327 0.607 0.162 0.765 0.550 1.000 0.565 0.556 0.775
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects are entered in every columns
Columns 1 to 7 report the system estimator results using attitudes towards trust of the country of residence
(treated as predeterminate) and attitudes towards trust of American immigrants (treated as exogenous) as
additional instruments. Columns 8 and 9 report the di⁄erence estimator results using attitudes towards
trust of American immigrants as additional instruments.
In all equations appropriately legged included variables are used as instruments.
gap, ben, serv_va treated as endogenous, edu_y, tax_wed, udens and epl as prederminate
For all variables only the shortest allowable lag is used as instrument.
42Table 9: GMM System Estimates for Log Average Annual Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
hours hours hours hours hours hours hours
holidays 0.0997** -0.0524*** -0.0511*** -0.0425* -0.0813*** -0.0781*** -0.0840***
(0.0444) (0.0187) (0.0177) (0.0217) (0.0292) (0.0220) (0.0203)
l_hours 0.990*** 0.972*** 0.963*** 0.839*** 0.950*** 0.914***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.134) (0.0835) (0.0786) (0.101)
gap -0.00151 -0.00249 -0.00296 0.000838 -0.000574
(0.00433) (0.00438) (0.00336) (0.00234) (0.00254)
serv_va 0.000433 0.00571*** 0.00468**
(0.00295) (0.00178) (0.00224)
epr_w 0.000483 -0.00125** -0.00135***
(0.000785) (0.000492) (0.000474)




udens 0.00141*** 0.00186*** 0.00195***
(0.000387) (0.000438) (0.000408)
ben -0.00120** -0.000904* -0.00106**
(0.000514) (0.000468) (0.000506)
Observations 41 36 36 36 36 36 36
AR(1)z-stat 0.780 -1.820 -1.483 -1.296 -1.283 -1.986 -1.879
Hansen-Pvalue 0.702 0.580 0.761 0.782 0.880 1.000 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Period E⁄ects are entered in every columns
In all columns religious attitudes of the country of residence (treated as predeterminate) and attitudes
towards trust and sex of American immigrants (treated as exogenous) are used as additional instruments
In all equations appropriately legged included variables are used as instruments.
gap, ben, serv_va, epr_w treated as endogenous, tax_wed, udens and epl as prederminate
For all variables only the shortest allowable lag is used as istrument.
43Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
epr_w 63.552 14.198 47
epr_y 49.984 11.497 47
hours 7.442 0.093 45
l_epr_w 56.158 16.255 47
l_epr_y 52.415 11.025 47
l_hours 7.485 0.099 39
women_cn -0.034 0.696 46
women_jp 0.764 0.113 33
youth_i 0.114 0.897 47
holidays -0.374 0.432 47
god 0.513 0.643 47
trust -1.088 0.351 47
week -1.785 0.794 47
imm_fework -0.096 0.31 44
imm_premarsx 0.249 0.3 44
imm_trust -1.346 0.298 44
ben 30.64 13.833 47
tax_wedge 44.038 9.336 47
epl 2.217 1.124 47
udens 40.375 22.194 47
gap -0.621 2.196 47
serv_va 65.231 5.446 47
edu_w 8.499 1.861 47
children 0.58 0.106 47
edu_y 0.1 0.364 47
pop65 14.318 2.196 47
prot 0.532 0.504 47
cath 0.404 0.496 47
other_rel 0.064 0.247 47
44